Informace o kvalifikační práci Analysis of the Effect of Militarization of Public Security and the National Gang Truce on Homicide Rates in El Salvador from 2009 to 2016.
Abstract
One of the main obstacles that constantly stagnates development in El Salvador is its violence epidemic. The country has ranked high on indexes that measure homicides and criminality since the end of its brutal civil war in the early nineties. Main gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS13), Barrio 18 and Barrio 18 Sure?os are often seen as the main responsibles for the increase in homicides, fear and insecurity throughout the country. In many communities these groups maintain a stronger hold than the actual government, they impose extortion on businesses, curfews on families, entry and exit restrictions for communities creating invisible yet very real borders that are not to be crossed by the populations they control. In the last years they have formalized their structures and amassed power through fear, being able to determine the number of homicides everyday or stop a whole country's transportation system.
On the other hand, the strategy from the state to counter gangs influence has been similar to the ones it used for other problems during the last century of military hegemony, iron fist repression. Wide militarization of the public security systems in the country have been the go-to plan to accomplish this, whether by recovering El Salvador's Armed Forces' (FAES) autonomy and status from its haydays, delegitimizing the National Civil Police (PNC) and other public security institutions, increasing the number of soldiers performing public security tasks or militarizing the police and its activities. Salvadoran society has not known uninterrupted true peace in years and therefore the response of its political class and society has continued to be short-sighted unoriginal policies that give out similar results.
In contrast to this response, 2012 saw the government negotiate with the gang structures through a truce successfully bringing down homicides nationally. This study measures the effects of these old and new strategies to see their actual effect on homicide rates in an attempt to determine which policies are more effective at protecting Salvadoran lives.
Anotace v angličtině
Abstract
One of the main obstacles that constantly stagnates development in El Salvador is its violence epidemic. The country has ranked high on indexes that measure homicides and criminality since the end of its brutal civil war in the early nineties. Main gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS13), Barrio 18 and Barrio 18 Sure?os are often seen as the main responsibles for the increase in homicides, fear and insecurity throughout the country. In many communities these groups maintain a stronger hold than the actual government, they impose extortion on businesses, curfews on families, entry and exit restrictions for communities creating invisible yet very real borders that are not to be crossed by the populations they control. In the last years they have formalized their structures and amassed power through fear, being able to determine the number of homicides everyday or stop a whole country's transportation system.
On the other hand, the strategy from the state to counter gangs influence has been similar to the ones it used for other problems during the last century of military hegemony, iron fist repression. Wide militarization of the public security systems in the country have been the go-to plan to accomplish this, whether by recovering El Salvador's Armed Forces' (FAES) autonomy and status from its haydays, delegitimizing the National Civil Police (PNC) and other public security institutions, increasing the number of soldiers performing public security tasks or militarizing the police and its activities. Salvadoran society has not known uninterrupted true peace in years and therefore the response of its political class and society has continued to be short-sighted unoriginal policies that give out similar results.
In contrast to this response, 2012 saw the government negotiate with the gang structures through a truce successfully bringing down homicides nationally. This study measures the effects of these old and new strategies to see their actual effect on homicide rates in an attempt to determine which policies are more effective at protecting Salvadoran lives.
Klíčová slova
Key words: gangs, truce, militarization, public security
Klíčová slova v angličtině
Key words: gangs, truce, militarization, public security
Rozsah průvodní práce
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Jazyk
AN
Anotace
Abstract
One of the main obstacles that constantly stagnates development in El Salvador is its violence epidemic. The country has ranked high on indexes that measure homicides and criminality since the end of its brutal civil war in the early nineties. Main gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS13), Barrio 18 and Barrio 18 Sure?os are often seen as the main responsibles for the increase in homicides, fear and insecurity throughout the country. In many communities these groups maintain a stronger hold than the actual government, they impose extortion on businesses, curfews on families, entry and exit restrictions for communities creating invisible yet very real borders that are not to be crossed by the populations they control. In the last years they have formalized their structures and amassed power through fear, being able to determine the number of homicides everyday or stop a whole country's transportation system.
On the other hand, the strategy from the state to counter gangs influence has been similar to the ones it used for other problems during the last century of military hegemony, iron fist repression. Wide militarization of the public security systems in the country have been the go-to plan to accomplish this, whether by recovering El Salvador's Armed Forces' (FAES) autonomy and status from its haydays, delegitimizing the National Civil Police (PNC) and other public security institutions, increasing the number of soldiers performing public security tasks or militarizing the police and its activities. Salvadoran society has not known uninterrupted true peace in years and therefore the response of its political class and society has continued to be short-sighted unoriginal policies that give out similar results.
In contrast to this response, 2012 saw the government negotiate with the gang structures through a truce successfully bringing down homicides nationally. This study measures the effects of these old and new strategies to see their actual effect on homicide rates in an attempt to determine which policies are more effective at protecting Salvadoran lives.
Anotace v angličtině
Abstract
One of the main obstacles that constantly stagnates development in El Salvador is its violence epidemic. The country has ranked high on indexes that measure homicides and criminality since the end of its brutal civil war in the early nineties. Main gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS13), Barrio 18 and Barrio 18 Sure?os are often seen as the main responsibles for the increase in homicides, fear and insecurity throughout the country. In many communities these groups maintain a stronger hold than the actual government, they impose extortion on businesses, curfews on families, entry and exit restrictions for communities creating invisible yet very real borders that are not to be crossed by the populations they control. In the last years they have formalized their structures and amassed power through fear, being able to determine the number of homicides everyday or stop a whole country's transportation system.
On the other hand, the strategy from the state to counter gangs influence has been similar to the ones it used for other problems during the last century of military hegemony, iron fist repression. Wide militarization of the public security systems in the country have been the go-to plan to accomplish this, whether by recovering El Salvador's Armed Forces' (FAES) autonomy and status from its haydays, delegitimizing the National Civil Police (PNC) and other public security institutions, increasing the number of soldiers performing public security tasks or militarizing the police and its activities. Salvadoran society has not known uninterrupted true peace in years and therefore the response of its political class and society has continued to be short-sighted unoriginal policies that give out similar results.
In contrast to this response, 2012 saw the government negotiate with the gang structures through a truce successfully bringing down homicides nationally. This study measures the effects of these old and new strategies to see their actual effect on homicide rates in an attempt to determine which policies are more effective at protecting Salvadoran lives.
Klíčová slova
Key words: gangs, truce, militarization, public security
Klíčová slova v angličtině
Key words: gangs, truce, militarization, public security
Zásady pro vypracování
In the last 20 years, crime and violence from gangs and organized crime have stagnated post-war development of northern Central America's countries: El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Although with little success their policy approach has been that of an iron fist increasing militarization and setting oppressive policies to fight the spread and influence on gangs in communities, this research aims to determine the influence and impact these policies have had on real homicide rates while including other relevant factors such as corruption, incarceration rates, gang truces etc. Scrutinizing these data should provide policy makers and researchers a better idea of the success of their current policies and a gateway towards better policy alternatives.
Zásady pro vypracování
In the last 20 years, crime and violence from gangs and organized crime have stagnated post-war development of northern Central America's countries: El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Although with little success their policy approach has been that of an iron fist increasing militarization and setting oppressive policies to fight the spread and influence on gangs in communities, this research aims to determine the influence and impact these policies have had on real homicide rates while including other relevant factors such as corruption, incarceration rates, gang truces etc. Scrutinizing these data should provide policy makers and researchers a better idea of the success of their current policies and a gateway towards better policy alternatives.
Seznam doporučené literatury
Hume, M. (2007). Mano Dura: El Salvador Responds to Gangs. Development in Practice, 17(6), 739–751. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25548280 Rodgers, D., Muggah, R., & Stevenson, C. (2009). Mano Dura: the war on gangs. In Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, and Interventions (pp. 12–15). Small Arms Survey. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10733.9 Rodgers, D., Muggah, R., & Stevenson, C. (2009). From first- to second-generation gang violence reduction policies. In Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, and Interventions (pp. 16–22). Small Arms Survey. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10733.10
Santos, F., Amador, L., Amaya, N., & Menjívar, J. S. (2020). Eficiencia del Gasto Público en seguridad ciudadana: Un Análisis Para Centroamérica. Economía y Administración (E&A), 11(2), 25–38. https://doi.org/10.5377/eya.v11i2.10518
Seznam doporučené literatury
Hume, M. (2007). Mano Dura: El Salvador Responds to Gangs. Development in Practice, 17(6), 739–751. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25548280 Rodgers, D., Muggah, R., & Stevenson, C. (2009). Mano Dura: the war on gangs. In Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, and Interventions (pp. 12–15). Small Arms Survey. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10733.9 Rodgers, D., Muggah, R., & Stevenson, C. (2009). From first- to second-generation gang violence reduction policies. In Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, and Interventions (pp. 16–22). Small Arms Survey. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10733.10
Santos, F., Amador, L., Amaya, N., & Menjívar, J. S. (2020). Eficiencia del Gasto Público en seguridad ciudadana: Un Análisis Para Centroamérica. Economía y Administración (E&A), 11(2), 25–38. https://doi.org/10.5377/eya.v11i2.10518
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Záznam průběhu obhajoby
Student Ríos Luna introduced the thesis “Analysis of the Effect of Militarization of Public Security and the National Gang Truce on Homicide Rates in El Salvador from 2009 to 2016“. The student covered the topics of gangs, violence, military, homicide and the effect of national policies on gang-related violence. The student used OLS regression and explained the dataset used in his thesis. The student discussed the results - there is a growing role of the military in fighting gang-related violence in Salvador. The reviews from the supervisor and reviewer were read out. The student reacted to the questions from the reviews. One of the questions regarded the data availability on military intervention at the municipal level. The data were triangulated with media news. It is still questionable how to find out the length of the military intervention precisely in Salvador. The student also answered the questions from the committee. For example, a question about underreporting of gang-related casualties.